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ABSTRACT
The transistors used to construct Integrated Circuits (ICs) continue
to shrink. While this shrinkage improves performance and density,
it also reduces trust: the price to build leading-edge fabrication
facilities has skyrocketed, forcing even nation states to outsource
the fabrication of high-performance ICs. Outsourcing fabrication
presents a security threat because the black-box nature of a fabri-
cated IC makes comprehensive inspection infeasible. Since prior
work shows the feasibility of fabrication-time attackers’ evasion of
existing post-fabrication defenses, IC designers must be able to pro-
tect their physical designs before handing them off to an untrusted
foundry. To this end, recent work suggests methods to harden IC
layouts against attack. Unfortunately, no tool exists to assess the
effectiveness of the proposed defenses—meaning gaps may exist.
This paper presents an extensible IC layout security analysis tool
called IC Attack Surface (ICAS) that quantifies defensive coverage.
For researchers, ICAS identifies gaps for future defenses to target,
and enables the quantitative comparison of existing and future
defenses. For practitioners, ICAS enables the exploration of the
impact of design decisions on an IC’s resilience to fabrication-time
attack. ICAS takes a set of metrics that encode the challenge of
inserting a hardware Trojan into an IC layout, a set of attacks that
the defender cares about, and a completed IC layout and reports
the number of ways an attacker can add each attack to the design.
While the ideal score is zero, practically, our experience is that
lower scores correlate with increased attacker effort.
To demonstrate ICAS’ ability to reveal defensive gaps, we analyze
over 60 layouts of three real-world hardware designs (a processor
and AES and DSP accelerators), protected with existing defenses.
We evaluate the effectiveness of each circuit/defense combination
against three attacks from the literature. Results show that some
defenses are ineffective and others, while effective at reducing the
attack surface, leave 10’s to 1000’s of unique attack implementations
for an attacker to exploit.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between complexity and security seen in software
also holds for Integrated Circuits (ICs). Since the inception of the
IC, transistor sizes have continued to shrink. For example, compare
∗Work done at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
†Corresponding faculty author
the 10 µm feature size of the original Intel 4004 processor [24]
to the 10nm feature size of Intel’s recently announced Ice Lake
processor family [3]. Smaller transistors enable IC designers to
create increasingly complex circuits with higher performance and
lower power-usage. However, continuing this trend pushes the laws
of physics and comes at a substantial cost: by 2020, the cost to build
a leading-edge fabrication facility is estimated to be $15–20B [43].
Such costs are prohibitive for not only most semiconductor
companies, but also nation states. Thus,most hardware design
houses are fabless, i.e., while they are able to fully design and
lay out an IC, they must outsource its fabrication. Outsourcing
combined with the black-box nature of a fabricated IC requires fab-
less semiconductor companies to trust that their physical designs
will not be altered maliciously by the foundry, also known as a
fabrication-time attack. Previous work demonstrates several ways a
fabrication-time attacker can insert a hardware Trojan into an oth-
erwise trusted IC [9, 28, 54]. A2 [54] demonstrates the most stealthy
and controllable IC fabrication-time attack to date, whereby a hard-
ware Trojan with a complex, yet stealthy, analog trigger circuit is
inserted into the finalized layout of a processor. Even though the
inserted Trojan is small, the attacker can trigger it and escalate to
a persistent software-level attack (i.e., a hardware foothold [27])
using only user-mode code.
Early work focuses on post-fabrication detection of hardware
Trojans in ICs [47]. Broadly, there are two classes of detection:
1) side-channel analysis and 2) Trojan-activation via functional
testing. Side-channel (power, timing, etc.) analysis [2, 26, 33, 35]
assumes that the Trojan’s trigger is complex (i.e., many logic gates);
thus, noticeably changes the physical characteristics of the chip.
For example, inserting the large amount of extra logic required
by a complex trigger into a design alters the power signature of
the device. Alternatively, Trojan-activation via functional testing
assumes that the Trojan’s trigger is simple (i.e., few logic gates [9,
28]); thus, easily activated by test vectors. Unfortunately, layering
detection classes is not sufficient as recent work shows that it is
possible to create an attack that is both small and stealthy [54].
To address the gaps left by post-fabrication Trojan detection
schemes, recent work focuses on pre-fabrication, IC layout-level,
Trojan prevention [5, 6, 14, 53]. IC layout-level defenses work by:
(1) increasing placement & routing resource utilization
(2) increasing congestion around security-critical design com-
ponents
The lack of resources deprives the attacker of the required transis-
tors needed to implement their Trojan trigger/attack circuits, and
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the increased congestion around security-critical wires acts as a
barrier for the attacker attempting to integrate their Trojan into the
victim design. Ideally, defenders utilize just enough resources and
create enough congestion such that the attacker cannot implement
and insert their attack, while keeping the design routable. Short
of that, the added barriers require the attacker to expend more
resources (e.g., time) to insert their attack into an IC layout.1
Two IC layout-level defensive approaches exist: 1) undirected
and 2) directed. Undirected approaches aim to (probabilistically)
increase resource utilization and congestion across the entire layout
by altering existing place-and-route parameters (e.g., core den-
sity [53]) that will likely result in increased resource utilization
and congestion. More recently, a line of directed approaches have
emerged [5, 6] that systematically increase utilization of specific-
regions of the device layer, i.e., nearby security-critical components.
Given that it is infeasible to occupy the entire device layer in a
tamper-evident manner [5] both classes of approaches may leave
IC layouts vulnerable to attack by an untrusted foundry.
To identify gaps in existing defenses and guide future IC layout-
level defenses, we design and implement an extensible measure-
ment framework that quantifies defensive coverage with respect to
specific foundry-level attacks. Our framework, IC Attack Surface
(ICAS), quantifies defensive coverage in three dimensions that cap-
ture the essence and difficulty of inserting a hardware Trojan at an
untrusted foundry:
(1) Trojan logic placement: finding unused space to place
additional circuit components
(2) Victim/Trojan integration: attaching hardware Trojan pay-
load to security-critical logic
(3) Intra-Trojan routing: connecting the trigger and payload
portions of the hardware Trojan
A successful attack requires all three steps.
Using ICAS, we analyze over 60 different IC layouts across three
fully-functional ASIC designs: an AES accelerator, a DSP acceler-
ator, and an OR1200 processor. For each layout, ICAS reports the
coverage against four attacks [21, 27, 40, 54] that span the digi-
tal and analog domain as well a range of attack outcomes. ICAS’s
analysis reveals that all existing IC layout-level defenses are in-
complete, leaving 1000’s of opportunities for an attacker at an
untrusted foundry to insert a hardware Trojan. An additional find-
ing is that even though most existing countermeasures do increase
the complexity of inserting a hardware Trojan, some countermea-
sures are ineffective. Lastly, ICAS’s analysis suggests that focusing
on exhausting resources on the device layer (i.e., transistors) is an
incomplete defense; future defenses should also aim to increase
congestion around security-critical wires.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose an extensible methodology that quantifies the
difficulty of inserting hardware Trojans into an existing IC
layout by an untrusted foundry.
• We design, implement, and open-source [4] our extensible
framework, ICAS, that computes various layout-specific se-
curity metrics. The ICAS framework provides an interface
1Time is the most critical resource for the attacker as IC fabrication is bounded in
terms of turnaround time.
Figure 1: The typical IC design process starts with a textual specification of
design requirements and ends with a fabricated and tested chip. Green check-
boxes mark trusted stages and red x-boxes mark the untrusted step (i.e., an
untrusted foundry). The fabrication step takes a GDSII file (physical IC lay-
out) as input and produces a wafer of die. While prior work proposes metrics
for untrusted front-end design [13, 21, 39, 48], no mechanism exists for mea-
suring an IC layout’s resilience to an untrusted foundry.
to programmatically query the physical layout of an IC (en-
coded in the GDSII format) to compute various security
metrics with respect to attacks-of-interest.
• We use ICAS to quantify the effectiveness and expose the
defensive gaps of previously-proposed untrusted foundry
defenses by analyzing over 60 IC layouts of three real-world
hardware cores.
• We identify future directions for defenses that work in a
layered fashion with existing defenses.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 IC Design Process
Figure 1 shows the typical IC design process [37], which consists of
three main phases: 1) front-end design, 2) back-end design, and 3)
fabrication. The front-end design phase can be further split into two
design abstraction levels, behavioral and structural, while a single
design abstraction level, physical (i.e., consists of both analog and
digital properties), encompasses the back-end. The front-end design
process begins by first describing the functionality of the circuit
at the behavioral level, also known as the Register Transfer Level
(RTL), using a hardware description language (HDL), like VHDL
or Verilog. Next, the behavioral level description of the circuit is
transformed into a structural level description during RTL synthesis.
RTL synthesis is similar to software compilation: the RTL design is
optimized and reduced to a set of logically connected digital logic
gates, called a gate-level netlist (netlists are commonly described
using an HDL language). The gate-level netlist is then passed to
the back-end design phase to be transformed into something able
to be implemented into a physical chip (i.e., an IC layout) through
a process known as Placement and Routing (PaR).
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Figure 2: Typical IC floorplan created during the place-and-route design
phase. The floorplan consists of an I/O pad ring surrounding the chip core.
Within the core is the placement grid. Circuit components are placed and
routed within the placement grid.
IC layouts consist of multiple layers. The bottom layers are de-
vice layers, while the top layers are metal layers. Device layers are
used for constructing circuit components (e.g., transistors), and
the metal layers are used for routing (e.g., vias and wiring). The
first stage of PaR is creating a floorplan. Figure 2 illustrates an IC
floorplan. To create a floorplan, the dimensions of the overall chip
are specified and the core area is defined. Typically a ring of I/O
pads is then placed around the chip core, while a placement grid is
drawn over the core. Each tile in the placement grid is known as
a placement site. Circuit components (e.g., standard cells) are then
placed on the placement grid, occupying one or more placement
sites, depending on the size of the component. Lastly, all compo-
nents are routed together, using one or more routing layers. The
output from the back-end design is a Graphics Database System II
(GDSII) file that is a geometric description of the placed-and-routed
circuit layout. The GDSII file is then sent to a fabrication facility
where it is manufactured. The final step is testing and packaging.
2.2 Hardware Trojans
2.2.1 Trojan Components. A hardware Trojan is a malicious
modification to a circuit designed to modify its behavior during
operation [8]. Hardware Trojans have two main components: 1)
trigger and 2) payload [12, 26, 52]. Prior work classifies hardware
Trojans based on the functionalities of their trigger and payload
mechanisms [12, 26, 52]. In this paper, we adopt and simplify an
existing hardware Trojan taxonomy [12]; shown in Figure 3.
The triggermechanism of a hardware Trojan is what initiates the
delivery of the Trojan’s payload. Triggers can be built by adding,
removing, or altering existing hardware in an IC. They can be
digital [27] or analog [54]. The ideal trigger is small: requiring few or
no additional circuit components, stealthy: requiring dozens of rare
events to activate, and controllable: readily attacker deployable, but
not so by defenders or through regular use. There have been several
triggers demonstrated before that span the trade-space of large
(requiring many additional gates) and stealthy [30] to the opposite:
small (requiring no additional gates) and easy to trigger [9, 41]. The
most advanced Trojans are small, stealthy, and controllable [54].
The payload mechanism receives a signal from the trigger and
alters the functionality of the IC. Analog [9, 41] and digital [54]
payloads exist, with a variety of effects. These effects can leak
Figure 3: An existing taxonomy of hardware Trojans [12]. This taxonomy
classifies hardware Trojans based on their trigger and payload types.
information [30], alter the internal state of the IC [54], or cause a
system to be unusable (denial-of-service) [41]. Regardless of effect,
the payload mechanism must route a wire to, or in the vicinity of,
some target “security-critical” [22] wire in the IC design.
2.2.2 Trojan Implementations. There are three ways a mali-
cious foundry can "insert" a hardware Trojan into an otherwise
trusted IC layout: additive, substitution, and subtractive. Additive
Trojans involve inserting additional circuit components and/or
wiring into an existing design. Substitution Trojans require remov-
ing logic with low observability to make room for additional Trojan
circuit components and/or wiring in an existing circuit design.
Lastly, subtractive Trojans require removing circuit components
and/or wiring to alter the behavior of a existing circuit design. The
focus of this paper is assessing defensive coverage with respect
to additive Trojans. Substitution and subtractive Trojans, while
intriguing, remain largely unexplored by the community. We do not
know of any demonstrably stealthy and controllable substitution or
subtractive Trojans and when researchers do create such an attack,
there exists orthogonal mitigation strategies [49].2
Inserting an additive Trojan at an untrusted foundry requires
modifying two fundamental characteristics of an IC’s physical
layout—placement and routing—regardless of how a an attacker
implements the Trojan’s trigger and payload. We define Trojan
placement to be the act of placing additional hardware compo-
nents into an IC layout for the purpose of crafting a Trojan trigger
and payload,Victim/Trojan integration to be wiring the Trojan’s
payload to, or in the vicinity, of a security-critical net in the victim
IC layout, and intra-Trojan routing to be the act of wiring the
hardware Trojan together. The most challenging aspect of insert-
ing a hardware Trojan at fabrication-time is finding empty space
on the IC’s device layer to insert the trigger and payload compo-
nents (Trojan placement), AND routing the payload to a security-
critical net (Victim/Trojan integration). ICAS quantifies each of
these fundamental tasks, in turn identifying weak points in the IC
layout that an attacker might exploit.
2Dopant-level Trojans are the closest substitution Trojan designs demonstrated in the
literature [9, 28]. Though their non-existent footprints make them difficult to detect via
side channels, their simplistic designs and limited controllability make them detectable
during post-fabrication testing [44].
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3 THREAT MODEL
We adopt a threat model for untrusted foundry attacks that as-
sumes all steps in the IC design process can be trusted, except for
all of the processes—no matter if they are outsourced—performed
by a foundry (colloquially, fabrication). Figure 1 depicts our threat
model. This entails that the RTL is designed, synthesized, and laid-
out by trusted parties. Post fabrication testing is also performed
by a trusted party. We adopt this threat model since the astronom-
ical costs to fabricate ICs force most semiconductor companies
to outsource fabrication. To this point, in 2005, the U.S. govern-
ment identified the untrusted foundry threat as the most significant
weakness of the microelectronics supply chain [18].
We restrict our threat model to fabrication-time attacks involv-
ing additive Trojans, i.e., hardware Trojans that require inserting
additional circuitry to a physical IC design. Previous work on sub-
stitution/subtractive hardware Trojans shows that such Trojan
insertion methods are addressable by measuring the controllability
and observability of logic at the behavioral and/or structural level
of the IC design, for which several methods have already been pro-
posed [11, 20, 21, 38, 39, 48, 55]. Orthogonally, this work fills the
void of quantifying the susceptibility of an IC design to additive
hardware Trojan insertion at the physical level of the IC design
process by an untrusted foundry.
Focusing on additive hardware Trojans, an adversary can only
insert additional components/wires. They cannot increase the size
of the chip to make additional room for the implants because this
is readily caught by defenders. As a result, an attacker has two
choices: find open space in the design large enough to accommo-
date the additional circuitry, or create open space in the design by
moving circuitry around. The latter is extremely challenging due
to its recursive nature, it runs the risk of violating fragile timing
constraints and manufacturing design rules, and it increases fabrica-
tion turnaround time (which is usually set to three months); any of
which could expose the Trojan. Therefore, our focus is identifying
open spaces suitable for hardware Trojan implementation.
4 UNTRUSTED FOUNDRY DEFENSES
To protect IC layouts against insertion of a hardware Trojan by
attackers at an untrusted foundry, two classes of defenses exist:
undirected and directed. Undirected defenses leverage existing
tuning knobs available during the IC layout process, but do not
differentiate between security-critical and general-purpose wires
and logic. Thus, undirected approaches provide probabilistic pro-
tection. On the other hand, directed defenses require augmenting
existing PaR tool flows to harden the resulting IC layout, focusing
on deploying defenses systematically around security-critical wires
and logic. Thus directed approaches provide targeted protection,
but increase the complexity of the place-and-route process.
This section provides an overview of the landscape of undirected
and directed defenses. The focus is the mechanism each defense
uses to increase the complexity faced by a foundry-level attacker.
We use the results of the defensive analysis in this section to develop
a set of unifying coverage metrics in the next section. Finally, in the
evaluation, we evaluate commercial IC layouts using the defense-
inspired metrics to quantify each defense’s coverage.
4.1 Undirected
The lowest cost approach for protecting an IC layout from a foundry-
level attacker is to take advantage of existing physical layout pa-
rameters (e.g., core density, clock frequency, and max transition
time) offered by commercial CAD tools [10, 53]. The goal is to in-
crease congestion across the component layer and the routing layer.
Ideally, this also results in increased congestion around security-
critical logic and wires. Practically, increases in congestion around
security-critical logic and wires is probabilistic.
Increased congestion is a symptom of increased resource uti-
lization; hence, there are fewer resources available to the attacker.
The most obvious resource that an attacker cares about are place-
ment sites on the component layer. Increasing the density, decreases
unused placement sites. Without sufficient placement sites, the at-
tacker cannot implement their Trojan logic. A less obvious resource
is attachment points on security-critical wires that serve as vic-
tim/Trojan integration points.. Increasing routing layer congestion
(via density and/or timing constraints) increases the blockage around
security-critical wires, meaning there are less integration points.
4.2 Directed
To address the shortcoming of undirected approaches, recent de-
fenses advocate focusing on security-critical logic and wires. Specif-
ically, the approaches aim to prevent the attacker from being able to
implement their hardware Trojan by occupying unused placement
sites (i.e., transistors) [5, 6]. The challenge is that the filler cells used
by these defenses must be tamper-evident, i.e., a defender must
be able to detect if an attacker removed filler cells to implement
their Trojan. Previous work shows that filling the entire component
layer with tamper-evident filler cells (e.g. [53]) is infeasible due to
routing congestion [6]. To make routing feasible, the most recent
placement-centric defense focuses on filling the unused placement
sites nearest security-critical logic first [5, 6].
Such placement-centric defenses increase the complexity faced
by the attacker in two ways. First, it is harder for the attacker to find
contiguous unused placement sites to implement their Trojan’s logic.
Second, an indirect complication is increased intra-Trojan routing
complexity. The more distributed the attacker’s placement sites,
the more long (i.e., uses upper routing layers) routes the attacker
must create. Additionally, since the unused placement sites are far
away from security critical logic, the attacker must make a longer,
more complex, route to connect their hardware Trojan to the victim
security-critical wire.
5 UNIFIED ATTACK METRICS
Drawing from existing untrusted foundry defenses, we create a
extensible set of IC layout attack metrics. We unify the objectives of
existing defenses by decomposing the act of inserting a hardware
Trojan into ICs at an untrusted foundry into three fundamental
tasks and corresponding metrics:
(1) Trojan logic placement: Trigger Space
(2) Victim/Trojan integration: Net Blockage
(3) Intra-Trojan routing: Route Distance
These tasks and accompanying metrics are the foundation for our
methodology of assessing defensive coverage of an IC layout against
an untrusted foundry. We implement our methodology as ICAS.
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Figure 4: Assume an attacker is attempting to insert 6 additional Trojan
components that consume a total of 9 placement sites (as shown). If insert-
ing these components on the Trivial placement grid (left), they can be placed
adjacent to each other to simplify intra-Trojan routing. If inserting these
components on the Difficult placement grid (middle), they must be scattered
across the grid, making intra-Trojan routing more challenging. The Not Pos-
sible placement grid (right) does not have enough empty placement sites to
accommodate the Trojan components.
5.1 Challenges of Trojan Placement
The first phase of mounting a fabrication-time attack is Trojan
placement. This requires locating unused placement sites on the
placement grid to insert additional circuit components. While prior
work [5, 6, 53] employs the notion of limiting the quantity of unused
placement sites as a defense against fabrication-time attacks, how
can we characterize unused placement sites to gain insight into the
feasibility of a fabrication-time attack on a given IC layout?
Only 60–70% of the placement cites are occupied in a typical IC
layout to allow space for routing [54]. To facilitate Trojan routing,
an attacker prefers open placement sites form contiguous (adjacent)
regions. This allows the attacker to drop-in a pre-designed Trojan,
or if one had not been pre-designed, it minimizes the intra-Trojan
routing complexity by confining the intra-Trojan routing to the
lowest routing layers, i.e., reducing the jumping and jogging of nets.
Such adjacency is classified in image processing as “4-connected”.
Therefore, a key factor that determines the difficulty of mounting
fabrication-time attacks is the difficulty of inserting additional cir-
cuit components into a finalized IC design. We rank this difficulty
in increasing order as follows.
(1) Trivial: the Trojan components fit within a single contigu-
ous group of 4-connected placement sites.
(2) Difficult: the Trojan components must be split across mul-
tiple contiguous groups of 4-connected placement sites. The
more groups of placement site groups, the more difficult
intra-Trojan routing becomes.
(3) Not Possible: the total area required by the hardware Trojan
exceeds that of available placement sites.
Figure 4 illustrates these difficulty levels. The susceptibility of
an IC design to fabrication-time attack can therefore be partially
quantified by the size and number of contiguous open sites on the
placement grid. This is the basis for ICAS’ Trigger Space metric.
5.2 Challenges of Victim/Trojan Integration
Routing the Trojan payload to the targeted security-critical net re-
quires the attacker to locate the nets of interest in the IC layout. We
assume the worst case: the attacker has knowledge of all security-
critical nets in the design, particularly, the nets they are trying to
Figure 5: The supervisor bit signal of the OR1200 processor SoC is the data
input to the supervisor register of the OR1200 CPU. The supervisor register
stores the privilege mode the processor is currently executing in. Changing
the value on this net changes the privilege level of the processor allowing
an attacker to execute privileged instructions. The more congested the area
around this net, the more difficult it is for a foundry-level attacker to attach
(or route in close proximity) a rogue wire to it.
extract information from or influence. An example of such a net
in the OR1200 processor [34] is the net that holds the privilege bit.
The attacker can acquire this knowledge either through a design-
phase co-conspirator or through advanced reverse-engineering
techniques [54]. No matter how the attacker gains this information,
we assume they have it with zero additional effort.
We extend this threat to include nets that influence security-
critical nets. To increase stealth, an attacker could also trace back-
wards from the targeted security-critical net, through logic gates, to
identify nets that influence the value of the targeted security-critical
net. This is called the fan-in of the targeted net. By connecting in
this way, the attacker sacrifices controllability for stealth as their
circuit modification is now physically separated from the security-
critical net. To gain back controllability, attackers must create a
more complex (hence larger) trigger circuit—decreasing the Trigger
Space score, as well as increasing the likelihood of visual and/or
side-channel detection. This tradeoff limits how many levels back
the attacker can integrate their payload.
Nomatter if the attacker is attacking the targeted security-critical
wire directly or indirectly, the attacker must attach to some victim
wire or route directly adjacent to it. Since an IC layout is three-
dimensional, it is possible for the attacker to attach to any open
point on the victim wire, either on the same layer (i.e., North, South,
East, West) or by coming in from an adjacent layer (i.e., above
or below). In the worst case, there are no other nets blocking the
attacker from attaching to the targeted security-critical net or its
N -level-deep influencers. In the best case, all attachment points
are blocked by other nets. To quantify the number of points along,
above, and below a targeted security-critical wire—and its N -deep
fan-in—we implement the Net Blockage metric. Figure 5 shows the
open (unblocked) integration points for the privilege net on the
OR1200 processor.
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5.3 Challenges of Intra-Trojan Routing
The final phase of a fabrication-time attack is Intra-Trojan rout-
ing. Intra-Trojan routing requires connecting the components that
comprise the trigger and payload portions of the hardware Trojan
together—including connecting to the integration point with the
victim—to form a complete hardware Trojan. In the worst case, the
attacker is able to find a single contiguous region to place the trigger
and payload components that is nearby the victim security-critical
net. Thus, routing the trigger and payload components will be triv-
ial and the wire used to inject the payload will be short. In the best
case, the attacker will have to implement their attack using many
4-connected placement regions (i.e., low Trigger Space score) and
the only integration point on the targeted security-critical net (i.e.,
high Net Blockage score) is as far away from the open placement
regions. Hence, we focus on quantifying the difficulty of routing
the payload output to open attachment points on targeted security-
critical nets (and its N -deep fan-in). To this end, we identify two
challenges of intra-Trojan routing:
• Comply with design and fabrication rules
• Meet Trojan and payload-delivery timing requirements
Complying with Design Rules. For each process technology,
there are many rules associated with how wires and components
must be laid out in a design. Some of these rules are defined in
the Library Exchange Format (LEF) [46] and contained in files
that are loaded by modern Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools
throughout the IC design process. There are two types of design
rules: 1) those regarding the construction of circuit components (i.e.,
standard cells), and 2) those regarding routing. We classify these
as component design rules and routing design rules, respectively. As
technology nodes shrink, both sets rules are becoming increasingly
complex [42].
It is vital for an attacker to comply with these design rules as
violating them risks exposure. If an attacker inserts additional logic
gates (standard cells) by making copies of existing components in
a design, they can avoid violating component design rules involved
with Trojan placement. However, to connect a wire from the Trojan
payload to security-critical target net(s), they must perform custom
Trojan routing. Therefore, complying with routing design rules is a
concern. Routing design rules include specifications for the min-
imum distance between two nets on a specific routing layer, the
minimum width of nets on a given layer, etc. Complying with these
rules becomes easier for an attacker if the security-critical target
net(s) are not blocked by other wires or components. The higher
the Net Blockage score, the more difficult it is to make a connection,
the more complex—and error prone—the route.
Meeting Timing Requirements. Every wire in an IC has a
resistance and a capacitance, making it behave like an RC circuit,
i.e., there is a time delay associated with driving the wire hiдh (logic
1) or low (logic 0). The longer the wire, the more time delay there
is [17]. If the target net(s) has timing constraints (e.g., setup and
hold times) that dictate when the payload signal must arrive at the
target net for the attack to be successful, the Trojan routing must
meet these constraints. Furthermore, the farther the target net is
from the payload circuit, the more obstacles that must be routed
around, increasing the routing distance even further. This is the
basis for ICAS’ Route Distance metric. A natural limit for Route
Figure 6: ICAS consists of two tools, Nemo and GDSII-Score, and fits into
the existing IC design process (Fig. 1) between PaR and fabrication. Nemo
analyzes a gate-level netlist and traces the fan-in to security-critical nets in
a design. GDSII-Score analyzes a GDSII file (i.e., an IC layout) and computes
metrics quantifying its vulnerability to a set of foundry-level attacks.
Distance is dictated by the clock frequency of the victim circuit, as
most attacks must operate synchronously with their victim.
6 AN EXTENSIBLE COVERAGE ASSESSMENT
FRAMEWORK
The ICAS framework is comprised of two tools, Nemo and GDSII-
Score, as shown in Figure 6. Nemo identifies security-critical wires
based on designer annotations and circuit dataflow, while GDSII-
Score assess the defensive coverage of a given IC layout against a
set of attacks. ICAS takes as input four sets of files: 1) gate-level
netlist (generated after all physical layout optimizations), 2) process
technology files, 3) physical layout files, and 4) set of attacks. The
process technology files include a Library Exchange Format (LEF)
file and layer map file [45, 46]. The physical layout files include
a Design Exchange Format (DEF) file and the GDSII file of an IC
layout [15, 46]. The attack files are are a list of properties for each
attack to assess coverage against: number of transistors, security-
critical wire(s) to attach to, and timing constraints. All ICAS input
files except the attack files are either generated-by or inputs-to
the back-end IC design phase, and hence are readily available to
back-end designers.
Though ICAS is extensible, our implementation includes three
security metrics that capture the challenges faced by a foundry-
level attacker looking to insert a hardware Trojan: amount and
size of open-placement regions (Trigger Space), quantity of viable
attachment points to targeted security-critical (and influencer) nets
(Net Blockage), and the proximity of open placement regions to
targeted security-critical net(s) (Route Distance). Together with
the attack requirements, these metrics quantify the complexity an
attacker faces for each step of inserting specific hardware Trojans
into the given IC layout. We describe the implementation of both
ICAS components below.
6.1 Nemo
Nemo is the first analysis tool in the ICAS framework. It takes as
input a Verilog netlist and automatically identifies the fan-in to root
security-critical nets, which is output in the form of a Graphviz
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dot file [16]. This is necessary since the inter-connected nature of
signals within a circuit design means an adversary could influence
the state of security-critical nets by controlling a net that is a part
of its fan-in. Like prior work [25, 31], Nemo assumes that HDL
designers have appended a unique signal prefix to various signals
considered “security-critical” in their designs at the RTL level. We
make this assumption since determining what signals are “security
critical” is easier with the semantics provided at the behavioral
(RTL) level. For annotation, we leverage existing security-critical
signal identification techniques [6, 22, 25, 56]. Unfortunately, exist-
ing tools do not extend past the RTL design phase. Thus, Nemo’s
task is to bridge the semantic gap and uncover duplicated or re-
named security-critical signals in the post-PaR netlist. Fortunately,
while synthesis and layout tools do modify a netlist by duplicat-
ing and removing signals and components (as part of optimization
and meeting performance requirements), they do not completely
rename existing signals. This makes it possible for Nemo to identify
root security-critical signals (flagged at the behavioral level) by
name at the physical level. To avoid removal of security-critical
signals, we modify synthesis and layout scripts to essentially lock
them in place. Nemo works backwards from root security-critical
signals to identify the fan-in to these signals. The search depth is a
configurable parameter of Nemo.
Nemo is implemented as a back-end target module to the open-
source Icarus Verilog (IVL) [51] Verilog compiler and simulation
tool written in C++. The IVL front-end exposes an API to allow
third-parties to develop custom back-end target modules. Nemo is a
custom target module (also written in C++) designed to be loaded by
IVL. Since gate-level netlists are often described with the same HDL
that was synthesized to generate the netlist (e.g., Verilog), we utilize
the IVL front-end to interpret the Verilog representation of the
netlist and our custom back-end target module, Nemo, to analyze
the netlist. We open-source Nemo [4] and release instructions on
how to compile and integrate Nemo with IVL.
6.2 GDSII-Score
GDSII-Score is the second analysis tool in the ICAS framework.
GDSII-Score is an extensible Python framework for computing
security metrics of a physical IC layout. It takes as input the fol-
lowing: Nemo output, GDSII file, DEF file, technology files (LEF
and layer-map files), and attacks description file. First, GDSII-Score
loads all input files and locates the security-critical nets within the
physical layout. Next, it computes security metrics characterizing
the susceptibility of an IC design to each of the input attacks. Specif-
ically, the three security metrics that we implement are: Trigger
Space: the difficulty of implementing the hardware Trojan, Net
Blockage: the difficulty of Trojan/victim integration, and Route
Distance: the difficulty of meeting Trojan timing constraints. We
open source the GDSII-Score framework and our security metric
implementations [4].
6.2.1 Metric 1: Trigger Space. The Trigger Space metric quan-
tifies the challenges of Trojan placement (§ 5.1). It computes a
histogram of open 4-connected regions of all sizes on an IC’s place-
ment grid. The more large 4-connected open placement regions
available, the easier it is for an attacker to locate a space to insert
Figure 7: A) Same-layer net blockage is computed by traversing the perime-
ter of the security-critical net, with granularity д, and extension distance
d , and determining if such points lie inside another component in the lay-
out. B) Adjacent-layer net blockage is computed by projecting the area of the
security-critical net to the layers above and below and determining the area
of the projections that are occupied by other components.
additional Trojan circuit components at fabrication time. A place-
ment site is considered to be “open” if the site is empty, or if it is
occupied by a filler cell. Filler cells, or capacitor cells, are inserted
into empty spaces during the last phase of layout to aid fabrication.
Since they are inactive, an attacker can create empty placement
sites by removing them, without altering the functionality or timing
characteristics of the victim IC.
To compute the trigger space histogram, GDSII-Score first con-
structs a bitmap representing the placement grid. Placement sites
occupied by standard cells (e.g., NAND gate transistors) are colored
while those that are open are not. Information about the size of
the placement grid and the occupancy of each site in the grid is
available in the Design Exchange Format (DEF) file produced by
commercial PaR tools. GDSII-Score then employs a breadth-first
search algorithm to enumerate the maximum size of all 4-connected
open placement regions.
6.2.2 Metric 2: Net Blockage. The Net Blockage metric quanti-
fies the challenges of integrating the hardware Trojan’s payload
into the victim circuit (§ 5.2). It computes the percent blockage
around security-critical nets and their influencers. The more con-
gested the area surrounding security-critical nets, the more difficult
it is to attach the Trojan circuitry to these nets. There are two types
of net blockage that are calculated for each security-critical net:
same-layer and adjacent-layer.
Same-layer blockage is computed by traversing points around
the perimeter (North, South, East, West) at a granularity of д, at a
specific distance, d , around the security-critical net and determin-
ing which points lie within other circuit components, as detailed
in Figure 7a. To determine if a specific point along the perimeter
lies within the bounds of another circuit component, we utilize
the point-in-polygon ray-casting algorithm [23]. The extension
distance, d , around the security-critical path element and the gran-
ularity of the perimeter traversal, д, are configurable in our imple-
mentation. However, we default to an extension distance of one
wire-pitch and a granularity of 1 database units, respectively, as
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defined in the process technology’s LEF file. The IC designs used
in our evaluation are built using a 45nm process technology, for
which 1 database units is equivalent to 0.5nm. Additionally, an
open region is considered “blocked” if it is not wide enough for a
minimal width wire to be routed through while maintaining the
minimal amount of wire spacing required on that metal layer, as
defined in the LEF file. The percentage of the perimeter length that
is blocked by other circuit components is considered the same-layer
blockage percentage.
Adjacent-layer blockage is computed by analyzing the area di-
rectly above and below a security-critical net, and computing the
total area of overlap between other components, as detailed in
Figure 7b. To calculate this overlap area we utilize the Weiler-
Atherton polygon clipping algorithm [50]. Additionally, any un-
blocked regions above or below the security-critical net are con-
sidered “blocked” if they are not large enough to accommodate
the smallest possible via geometry allowed on the respective via
layer, as defined in the LEF file. The percentage of the total top and
bottom area that is blocked by nearby circuit components is the
adjacent-layer blockage percentage.
The same-layer and adjacent-layer blockage percentages are
combined via a weighted average to form a comprehensive overall
net blockage percentage where 66% is based on same-layer blockage
(north, south, east, and west) and 33% is based on adjacent-layer
blockage (top and bottom). We weight the same-layer blockage by
66%, or 23 , because 4 out of 6 total sides of a wire (north, south,
east, west, top, and bottom) are on the same layer. Likewise, we
weight the adjacent-layer blockage by 33%, or 13 .
Lastly, a total same-layer, adjacent-layer, and overall net block-
age metric is computed for the entire IC design. For an IC design
with n security-critical nets, the same-layer (bsame), adjacent-layer
(badjacent), and overall (boverall) net blockage metrics are computed
according to equations 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
bsame =
∑n
i=1 perimeter_blockedn∑n
i=1 perimetern
(1)
badjacent =
∑n
i=1 area_blockedn∑n
i=1 2 ∗ arean
(2)
boverall =
(
2
3 ∗ bsame
)
+
(
1
3 ∗ badjacent
)
(3)
6.2.3 Metric 3: RouteDistance. The Route Distancemetric com-
bines the Net blockage and Trigger Space metrics to quantify the
difficulty of of meeting Trojan and attack timing constraints (§ 5.3).
It computes a conservative estimate, i.e., Manhattan distance, for
the minimal routing distance between open trigger placement sites
and the n least blocked integration sites on the targeted security
critical nets. It cross-references each Manhattan distance with the
distribution of net lengths within the entire IC design. Net length
can impact whether or not the Trojan circuit will meet timing
constraints and function properly. Understanding where in the dis-
tribution of net lengths the Trojan routing falls provides insights
into the ability of the Trojan circuit to meet its timing requirements
and is an opportunity for outlier-based defenses. In summary, the
more Manhattan distances that fall within one standard deviation
of the mean net length, the easier it is to carry out an attack.
Trojan # StdCells
# Placement
Sites
Timing
Critical?
A2 Analog [54] 2 20 ✗
A2 Digital [54] 91 1444 ✓
Privilege
Escalation [21, 27] 25 342 ✓
Key Leak [40] 187 2553 ✓
Table 1: Hardware Trojans used in defensive coverage assessment.
We implement the Route Distance metric as follows. First, the
Net Blockage and Trigger Space metrics are computed. Next, the
the distribution of all net-lengths within the IC layout are com-
puted. Then, two-dimensional Manhattan distances between all
unblocked nets (< 100% overall net blockage) and trigger spaces
are calculated. The Manhattan distance calculated is the minimum
distance between a given trigger space and security-critical net,
i.e., the minimum distance between any placement site within the
given trigger space and any unblocked location on the targeted
security-critical net. Lastly, each Manhattan distance is reported in
terms of standard deviations away from the mean net-length in the
given IC layout.
7 EVALUATION
We use ICAS to quantify the defensive coverage of existing de-
fensive layout techniques—revealing that gaps persist. First, we
analyze the effectiveness of undirected defenses [53]. Specifically,
we measure the impact of varying both physical and electrical
back-end design parameters of the same IC layout on its suscep-
tibility to attack. Second, we analyze the effectiveness of directed
defenses [5, 6]. Specifically, we measure the coverage of existing,
placement-oriented, defensive layout schemes in preventing the
insertion of an attack by the foundry. Beyond revealing gaps, our
results reveal that there is an opportunity for a improving both
directed and undirected defenses that systematically eliminates
Trojan/victim integration points. Lastly, our evaluation also demon-
strates that ICAS is design-agnostic, works with commercial tools,
and scales to complex IC layouts.
7.1 Experimental Setup
We utilize three IC designs for our evaluations: OR1200 processor
SoC, AES accelerator, and DSP accelerator. The OR1200 processor
SoC is an open-source design [34] used in previous fabrication-time
attack studies [54]. The AES and DSP accelerator designs are open-
sourced under the Common Evaluation Platform (CEP) benchmark
suite [32]. The OR1200 processor SoC consists of a 5-stage pipelined
OR1200 CPU that implements the 32-bit OR1K instruction set and
Wishbone bus interface. The AES accelerator supports 128-bit key
sizes. The DSP accelerator implements a Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) algorithm.
All designs target a 45nm Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI) process
technology. We synthesize and place-and-route all designs with Ca-
dence Genus (version 16.23) and Innovus (version 17.1), respectively.
In our first evaluation (§ 7.2) the design constraints (clock frequency,
max transition time, core density) used for both synthesis and lay-
out are varied as noted. However, in our second evaluation (§ 7.3)
the same design constraints (100MHz clock frequency, 100 ps max
transition time, 60% core density) were used for both synthesis
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Figure 8: Trigger Space distributions for 15 different OR1200 processor IC layouts. Core density and max transition time parameters are varied across the
layouts, while target clock frequency is held constant at 1 GHz . The boxes represent the middle 50% (interquartile range or IQR) of open placement regions in a
given layout, while the dots represent individual open placement region sizes.
and layout to form a common baseline. All ICs are synthesized
and placed-and-routed on a server with 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon E5-
2640 CPU and 64GB of memory running Red Hat Enterprise Linux
(version 6.9).
7.1.1 Security-critical Signals. The first tool in the ICAS flow
is Nemo. Nemo tracks security-critical signals from the HDL level
to the IC layout level. The first step is flagging root security-critical
signals at the RTL level, for each IC design. For the OR1200 pro-
cessor SoC, the supervisor bit signal supv is flagged. We select this
signal because one can alter the state of this bit to escalate the
privilege mode of the processor [54]. For the AES accelerator, we
flag all 128 key bits as security-critical. The next_out signal within
the DSP accelerator was flagged as security-critical. The next_out
signal of the DSP accelerator indicates to external hardware when
an FFT computation is ready at the output registers. Tampering
with the next_out signal allows the attacker to hide specific out-
puts of the DSP accelerator. Lastly, Nemo marks, for each design’s
IC layout, all root security-critical nets and their 2-deep fan-in as
security-critical nets.
7.1.2 Hardware Trojans. Table 1 lists the hardware Trojan de-
signs that we use in our quantification of defensive coverage. The
first two Trojan designs (analog and digital variants of A2) are
attacks on the OR1200 processor and DSP accelerator ICs. With re-
spect to the OR1200, the A2 attacks act as a hardware foothold [27]
for a software-level privilege escalation attack. With respect to the
DSP accelerator, the A2 attacks suppress the next_out signal (§ 7.1).
The Privilege Escalation Trojan targets solely the OR1200 and the
Key Leak solely the AES accelerator.
7.1.3 Build Environment. Both ICAS tools (Nemo and GDSII-
Score) were run on the same server as the synthesis and place-
and-route CAD tools. Nemo and Icarus Verilog were compiled from
source using GCC (version 4.4.7). For increased performance, GDSII-
Score was executed using the PyPy Python interpreter with JIT
compiler (version 4.0.1) [36].
7.2 Undirected Defense Coverage
As detailed in § 4.1, a defensive strategy for protecting an IC layout
from foundry-level attackers is to exploit physical layout parame-
ters (e.g., core density, clock frequency, and max transition time)
offered by commercial CAD tools to increase congestion—hopefully
around security-critical wires. The tradeoff is that while this is a low
cost defense in that CAD tools already expose such knobs, the entire
design is impacted and there is no guarantee that security-critical
wires will be protected. We use ICAS and its three security metrics
to quantify the effectiveness of such undirected approaches [53].
To uncover the impact of each parameter, we start by generating
60 different physical layouts of the OR1200 processor design by
varying:
(1) Target Core Density (%): 50, 70, 90
(2) Clock Frequency (MHz): 100, 200, 500, 1000
(3) Max Transition Time (ps): 100, 150, 200, 250, 300
Target core density is a measure of how congested the placement
grid is. Typically, designers select die dimensions that achieve ∼60–
70% placement density to allow space for routing [54]. Target clock
frequency is the desired speed at which the circuitry should per-
form. Typically, designers select the clock frequency based on per-
formance goals. Max transition time is the longest time required
for the driving pin of a net to change logical values. Typically, de-
signers choose a value for max transition time based upon power
consumption and combinational logic delay constraints.
For each of the 60 layout variations we compute ICAS metrics.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 provide a visual representation for each metric.
Overlaid on Figure 10 are the number of unique attack (color-coded)
implementations for each Trojan (Tab. 1) at six parameter configu-
rations. Across the 60 IC layouts, the time it took ICAS to complete
its analyses ranged from 38 seconds to 18 minutes. On average,
this translates to less than 10% of the combined synthesize and
place-and-route run-times. These run-time results demonstrate the
deployability of ICAS as a back-end design analysis tool. Overall,
our evaluation indicates that while some of these layout parameters
do increase attacker complexity, none are sufficient on their own.
Next we break down the results metric-by-metric.
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Figure 9: OverallNet Blockage results computed across 20 different OR1200
processor IC layouts. A target density of 50% was used for all layouts, while
target clock frequency and max transition time parameters were varied.
7.2.1 Trigger Space Analysis. Figure 8 shows the distributions
of open trigger spaces across 15 unique OR1200 layouts. We vary
target core density and max transition time parameters across lay-
outs, while we fix the target clock frequency at 1GHz. A trigger
space is defined as a contiguous region of open placement sites
on the device layer placement grid and is measured by number of
contiguous “4-connected” placement sites. Each box represents the
middle 50%, or interquartile range (IQR), of open trigger space sizes
for a given IC layout. The dots represent individual data points
within and outside the IQR. Our empirical results affirm prior no-
tions [5, 6, 53] that increasing the target core density of an IC layout
results in fewer large open spaces to insert hardware Trojans. Addi-
tionally our results indicate that at lower densities, decreasing the
max transition time constraint decreases the median trigger space
size. Similar trends occur at lower clock frequencies. While results
show that modulating target core density is effective, observe that
even in the best case, large trigger spaces remain.
7.2.2 Net Blockage Analysis. Figure 9 shows the Net Blockage
metric (Eq. 3) computed across 20 unique OR1200 layouts. We fix
the target density at 50% across all layouts, while the target clock
frequency and max transition time are varied (as listed above). The
results show that at lower clock frequencies a smaller max transi-
tion time parameter corresponds to increased Net Blockage. This
corresponds to less open Trojan/victim integration points available
to the attacker. However, as clock speed increases, the correlation
between max transition time and overall Net Blockage deteriorates.
Intuitively, smaller max transition times should lead to smaller aver-
age net-lengths within the design, as transition time is a function of
the capacitive load on the net’s driving pin [17]. Shorter net-lengths
result in more routing congestion as components cannot be spread-
out across the die. However, capacitive load (on a driving pin) is
inversely proportional to frequency, thus at higher clock frequen-
cies the max-transition time constraint is more easily satisfied, and
altering it has less effect on the Net Blockage. Given these results,
the effectiveness of modulating transition time is context dependent
and—even in the best case—open integration points remain.
7.2.3 Route Distance Analysis. Figure 10 shows the Route Dis-
tances across 6 various OR1200 layouts in the form of heatmaps
that capture the trade space between layout parameters. Core den-
sity and max transition times were varied across the layouts (in-
dicated in the labels), while clock frequency was held constant
Figure 10: Heatmaps of routing distances across six unique IC layouts of
the OR1200 processor. Core density and max transition times are labeled.
Each heatmap is to be read column-wise, where each column is a histogram,
i.e, the color intensity within a heatmap column indicates the percentage
of (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs that are within a (y-axis) distance apart.
Overlaid are rectangles, indicating regions on each heatmap a given attack
can exploit, and numbers indicating the number of unique attack implemen-
tations.
at 100MHz. Each heatmap describes several (column-wise) his-
tograms of Route Distances in terms of standard deviations from the
mean net length observed in that particular IC layout (y-axis). The
Route Distances reported are those between any unblocked security-
critical nets, and trigger spaces large enough to hold an attack of a
given size range (x-axis). That is, the color intensities within in a
given heatmap column indicate the percentage of (security-critical-
net, trigger-space) pairs in that column that are within a range of
distance apart. Additionally, overlaid on each heatmap are rect-
angles indicating the region of the heatmap where a given attack
(Tab. 1) can be implemented, and the number of possible attack
configurations, (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, that can
be exploited.
If timing is critical to the operation of an attacker’s desired
Trojan, (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs with routing distances
significantly greater than the average net length in the IC layout
are less likely to be viable candidates for constructing hardware
Trojans. IC layouts with few desirable (critical-net, trigger-space)
pairs are much more time-consuming to attack. Namely, the IC
layouts with heatmaps that indicate a higher percentages of far-
apart (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, where the trigger spaces are
small, are most secure. From Figure 10, we conclude that at high
density, max transition time has little affect on IC layout security;
while at lower densities, lower max transition time designs are
more secure. Similar trends exist across other layout parameters,
as shown in Figures 12–14 in Appendix A.
7.2.4 Cost of Varying Layout Parameters. The results indicate
that increasing core density is effective, but incomplete, and in-
creasing clock frequency and decreasing max transition time is
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marginally effective and incomplete. While tuning these parame-
ters is low cost to the designer, there is a cost to the design in terms
of complexity and power requirements. We elucidate by discussing
how varying each design parameter (density, clock frequency, and
max transition time) impacts non-security characteristics of a cir-
cuit design.
While increasing core density to 90% makes placing-and-routing
a Trojan more difficult, it also makes placing-and-routing the rest
of the design more challenging. Specifically, it can become nearly
impossible to meet timing closure for the entire design if there is
not enough space within the core area to re-size cells and/or add
additional buffer cells. Depending on performance and security
requirements, a layout engineer may choose to relax timing con-
straints in order to achieve a higher core density. Alternatively,
a layout engineer may attempt to surround security-critical nets
with areas of high densities, while maintaining a lower overall core
density, as previously suggested [5, 6].
Decreasing the maximum transition time and increasing the
clock speed of an entire circuit design makes it more difficult to
place-and-route a functional Trojan that meets timing constraints,
but also directly impacts the performance characteristics of the
circuit. Additionally it is important to note that max transition
time is related to the clock frequency, so varying one without
the other changes performance tolerances. While increasing the
performance of the design might increase security, it comes at the
cost of increasing power consumption. Depending on the power-
consumption requirements of the design, it may be possible for a
designer to over-constrain these parameters for added security.
7.3 Directed Defense Coverage
As an alternative to probabilistically adding impediments to the
attacker inserting a hardware Trojan, recent works proposes a
directed approach. As detailed in § 4.2, placement-centric directed
defenses [5, 6] attempt to prevent the attacker from implementing
their Trojan by occupying all open placement sites with tamper-
evident filler cells. The limitation with such defenses is that it
is infeasible to fill all open placement sites with tamper-evident
logic [6]. Thus, the defenses focus their filling near security-critical
logic, leaving gaps near the periphery of the IC layout. Whether
these open placement sites near the periphery are sufficient to
implement an attack is an open question.
The goal of this evaluation is to determine not only if it is still
possible for a foundry-level attacker to insert a hardware Trojan,
given placement-centric defenses, but to quantify the number of
viable implementations available to the attacker—to act as a surro-
gate for attacker complexity. For the evaluation, We use our three
IC designs (OR1200 processor SoC, AES accelerator, and DSP accel-
erator). For each design, we create two IC layouts: (1) unprotected
and (2) protected. For the protected IC layout, we use the latest
placement-centric defense [5]; using the identified security-critical
wires (§ 7.1) to direct the defense. We layout all IC designs us-
ing the these parameters: target clock frequency of 100MHz, max
transition time of 100ps , and a target core density of 60%.
We then use ICAS to asses the defensive coverage of each of the
six IC layouts. This analysis has two goals: (1) determine whether
the IC is vulnerable to attack and (2) understand the impact of
Figure 11: Routing Distance heatmaps across three IC designs, with and
without the placement-centric defense described in [5, 6]. Heatmaps should
be interpreted similar to Fig. 10
applying the defense.We answer both questions in an attack-centric
manner using the hardware Trojans in Table 1 to asses defensive
coverage against. For each attack/IC layout combination we plot the
number of (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pairs that could be
used in implementing each Trojan. A (security-critical-net, trigger-
space) pair is considered a viable candidate for implementing a
Trojan if:
(1) the trigger space size is at least as large as the minimum
number of placement sites required to implement the desired
hardware Trojan design
(2) the security-critical net is less than 100% blocked
(3) if the hardware Trojan is “Timing-Critical”, i.e., it must func-
tion at the design’s core operating frequency, then the dis-
tance between the trigger space and open integration point
on the security-critical net must be ≤ 3 standard deviations
from average net length; otherwise, any distance is allowed.3
Figure 11 shows the defensive coverage for each IC design. Over-
laid on each heatmap are rectangles (and numbers) indicating
unique possible attack implementations. These results show that
existing placement-centric defenses are effective at reducing an IC’s
fabrication-time attack surface, compared to no defense—but gaps
persist. Given that filling placement sites with tamper-evident logic
is already maximized, these results point to systematically adding
congestion around security-critical wires as a means to close all
remaining defensive gaps; i.e., a directed version with similar effect
to existing undirected defenses.
3Three standard deviations from the average net length is the threshold for Trojan to
integration point routing with violating timing constraints, because it accounts for
99.7% of the designs’ wires—outliers tend to be power wires. For an exact calculation
it is possible to extract parasitics for a target for a Trojan’s route to determine if it
violates timing constraints.
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8 DISCUSSION
ICAS is the first tool to provide insights into the security of physical
IC layouts. ICAS is extensible across many dimensions including
CAD tools, process technologies, security metrics, and fabrication-
time attacks and defenses. To demonstrate ICAS’ capabilities we
implemented three security metrics (net blockage, trigger space,
and routing distance) using it. The focus of this paper is using these
metrics to quantitify the coverage of existing untrusted foundry
defenses; which shows that IC designs are still vulnerable to attack.
We envision uses for ICAS beyond this, as an integral part of the
IC design using commercial tools.
ICAS-Driven Defensive Layout: ICAS provides an added no-
tion of security to the IC layout process (place-and-route) to enable
researchers to explore countermeasures against fabrication-time
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the targeted defensive IC lay-
out techniques that exist [5, 6, 53] are placement-centric, i.e., filling
unused space on the device layer with functional logic cells. While
ICAS is capable of evaluating placement-centric defensive layout
techniques, its security-insights also asses routing-centric defensive
layout techniques. For example, layout engineers can leverage ICAS
to create high degrees of routing congestivity in close proximity to
security-critical nets. ICAS’ security metrics enable IC layout de-
signers to optimize the security of both the placement and routing
of their designs.
Extensibility of CAD Tools: Almost all steps of the IC design
process utilize CAD tools. ICAS integrates into a commercial IC
design process after placement-and-routing (Figure 1). While ICAS
is validated with IC layouts generated by Cadence tools, integrat-
ing ICAS with other vendors’ CAD tools requires no additional
effort due to the common process technology (LEF) and GDSII
specifications used by ICAS.
Extensibility of Process Technologies:We test ICAS using IC
layouts built with a 45nm SOI process technology; however, ICAS
is agnostic of process technology. The LEF and layer map files (§ 6)
are the only ICAS input files that are process technology dependent.
A LEF file describes the geometries and characteristics of each
standard cell in the cell library, and the layer map file describes the
layer name-to-number mappings, respectively, for a given process
technology. ICAS adapts to different process technologies provided
that all input files adhere to their specifications [45, 46].
Extensibility of Security Metrics: GDSII-Score is the ICAS
tool that computes security metrics from an IC layout. It loads
several files describing the IC layout to instantiate a single Python
class (called “Layout”) that contains query-able data structures
containing a polygon representation of all components in the lay-
out. Additionally, GDSII-Score contains several subroutines that
compute spatial relationships between polygon objects and points
within the layout. From these data structures and the provided
subroutines, it is trivial to integrate additional novel metrics into
GDSII-Score. To facilitate additional metrics, we open source GDSII-
Score [4], and our three example metrics that demonstrate how to
query the main “Layout” data structure.
9 RELATEDWORK
Fabrication-time attacks and defenses have been extensively re-
searched. Attacks have ranged in both size and triggering-complexity
[9, 28, 30, 41, 54]. Defenses against these attacks include: side-
channel analysis [2, 7, 26, 33], imaging [1, 57], on-chip sensors [19,
29], and preventive measures [5, 6, 14, 53]. The most pertinent
attacks and defenses are highlighted below.
Untrusted-foundry Attacks: The first foundry-level attack
was conceived by Lin et al. [30]. This hardware Trojan was com-
prised of approximately 100 additional logic gates and designed to
covertly leak the keys of an AES cryptographic accelerator using
spread spectrum communication to modulate information over a
power side channel. While the authors only demonstrated this at-
tack on an FPGA, they are the first to mention the possibility of
this type of Trojan circuit being implanted at an untrusted foundry.
The A2 attack [54] is the most recent fabrication-time attack.
A2’s analog triggering mechanism is stealthy, controllable, and
small. It prevents the Trojan from being exposed during post-
fabrication testing, or unintentionally through common usage. The
attack requires only two additional standard cells and evades every
known detection mechanism to date. ICAS quantifies the defensive
coverage to these and other fabrication-time attacks.
Untrusted-foundryDefenses:Most untrusted foundry defenses
rely on post-fabrication detection schemes [1, 2, 7, 19, 26, 29, 33,
57]. ICAS aims to guide innovation in preventive defenses against
fabrication-time attacks, for which few mechanisms currently ex-
ist [5, 6, 14, 53]. We highlight some of these preventive measures
and how ICAS could measure their effectiveness.
While preventive security-by-design was first explored at the
behavioral (RTL) level by of Jin et al. [25], Xiao et al. were the first
to demonstrate security-by-design at the layout-level with their
BISA (Built-In Self-Authentication) scheme [53]. The undirected
BISA approach attempts to eliminate all unused space on the de-
vice layer placement grid, and create routing congestion, by filling
the device layer with interconnected tamper-resistant fill cells. Al-
ternatively, recognizing the impracticality of filling 100% of the
empty placement sites in complex circuit designs, Ba et al. take a
directed approach to filling empty placement cites [5, 6]. Specif-
ically, they only fill empty placement sites in close proximity to
security-critical nets.
10 CONCLUSION
ICAS is an extensible framework that we use to expose and quan-
tify gaps in existing defenses to the threat posed by an untrusted
foundry. ICAS has two high-level components: Nemo, a tool that
bridges the semantic gap across IC design processes by tracking
security-critical signals across all stages of hardware development
and GDSII-Score, a tool that quantifies the difficulty a foundry-level
attacker faces in attacking security-critical logic. Experiments with
over 60 IC layouts across three open-source hardware cores and
four foundry-level hardware Trojans reveal that all current defenses
leave the IC design vulnerable to attack—and some are totally inef-
fective. These results show the value of a tool like ICAS that can
help designers identify and address defensive gaps.
From a high level, ICAS is momentus in that it makes security a
first-class concern during IC layout (in addition to power, area, and
performance): ICAS allows IC designers to measure the security
implications of tool settings and design decisions. ICAS fits well
with existing IC design tools and flows, allowing them to consider
12
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security. ICAS is a critical measurement tool that enables the sys-
tematic development of future physical-level defenses against the
threat of an untrusted foundry.
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A ROUTE DISTANCES OF OR1200 LAYOUTS
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Figure 12: Route DistanceMetric for OR1200 at 50% Density).A target density of 50%was held across each layout, while target clock frequency andmax transition
time parameters were varied from 100MHz to 1000MHz and 100 ps to 300 ps respectively. Each heatmap is intended to be read column-wise, where each column
is a histogram. The color intensity within a heatmap column indicates the percentage of (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, within that column, that are within a
range of distance away. The y-axis reports the distance in terms of standard deviations from the overall mean net-length in each design. The x-axis reports the
trigger space sizes in number of contiguous placement sites. Designs with smaller trigger-spaces and long route distances are more resistant to fabrication-time
attacks. Namely, a heatmap column that is completely dark indicates no (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, or attack points, and a column that is completely dark
except for the top-most cell is the second most secure.
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Figure 13: Route Distance Metric for OR1200 at 70% Density. Same as Fig. 12, except a target density of 70% was held across each layout.
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Figure 14: Route Distance Metric for OR1200 at 90% Density. Same as Fig. 12, except a target density of 90% was held across each layout.
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